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WHAT'S ALL THE RACKET?: THE USE OF
RICO DISGORGEMENT, THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT IT CAUSED, AND ITS IMPROPRIETY
MATTHEW SPITZERt

INTRODUCTION

The news is constantly saturated with reports of corporate
fraud and the damage each instance leaves in its wake. Since the
recent large scandals of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, among
others, the federal government, in a desperate effort to gain
control, has employed several innovative methods of fighting
such corporate misconduct.1 Some of these strategies have
included new federal legislation, criminal sanctions for corporate
board members, and various other prosecutorial statutes. 2 As
t Candidate for J.D. St. John's University School of Law, 2007; B.A., magna cum laude,
Political Science, Bucknell University, 2003.
1 For an overview of the various measures employed by the federal government in the
wake of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other major corporate financial scandals, see John
Paul Lucci, Enron - The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International
Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212-18 (2003). The actions of Enron,
WorldCom, Qwest Global Crossing, and Tyco cost shareholders a total of $460 billion
dollars. Such tremendous loss led Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") to promulgate several new rules and regulations to keep a tighter leash on
America's corporations. One such reactionary rule required the chief executive officers of
the 947 largest American corporations to certify their financial statements. See Paul
Beckett, Executives Face Harsh Sanctions in Corporate-GovernanceLaw, WALL ST. J.,
July 31, 2002, at C7. In addition, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) ("Sarbanes-Oxley"), in an effort to further control
America's financial giants. See David Kaplan, Landmark Act Imposes Controversial
Measures on Accounting Industry, 4 LAW. J. 7, 7 (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley ushered in many
new recordkeeping requirements, and was "primarily designed to restore financial
confidence in American securities markets." Lucci, supra at 216.
2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2003) Failure of Corporate Officers to Certify Financial
Reports:
(c) Criminal Penalties. Whoever (1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section knowing
that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the
requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $ 1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
(2) willfully certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
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each method has its own unique limitations, the federal
government has turned to an older statute, the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").3 Specifically the
government has employed RICO's seldom used civil provision.4
Controversially, the government has attempted to disgorge
corporate profits using this civil provision.
RICO disgorgement has been met with varying responses.
Most recently, a split among the federal circuits has occurred,
which the Supreme Court has since denied certiorari. 5 Thus, an
interesting divide remains regarding the use of this unique
legislation. The split is specifically between the Second Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit with United States v. Carson6 and United
States v. Philip Morris7 respectively. This split has raised
questions regarding its legality and its usefulness. Due to the
bitter divide with no apparent mediating entity, this note will
examine the jurisprudential, practical, and policy uses of the
knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all
the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $ 5,000,000, or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Indeed, under Sarbanes-Oxley, the knowing falsification of corporate records subjects
executives to "fines of as much as $5 million or as many as 20 years in prison, or both."
Beckett, supra note 1, at C7.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c):
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter [18 USCS § 1962] may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable
as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962 [18 USCS §
1962]. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any
person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of
limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
This section "allows civil claims to be brought by any person injured in their business or
property by reason of a RICO violation." A person who successfully establishes a civil
RICO claim will automatically receive judgment "in the amount of three times their
actual damages and would be awarded their costs and attorneys' fees." Jeff Grell, Rico
Act, http://www.ricoact.com (last visited February 11, 2007).
5 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 126 S.Ct. 478 (2005). In United States v.
Carson,the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the language of 18 United
States Code ("U.S.C.") section 1964(a) to limit disgorgement to cases where there was a
finding "that the gains [were] being used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or
constitute capital available for that purpose." 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995). However,
in United States v. Philip Morris, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to follow that conclusion, finding that there was "no justification for considering
any order of disgorgement to be forward-looking as required by Section 1964(a)." 396 F.3d
1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
6 52 F.3d 1173.
7 396 F.3d 1190.
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provision. Ultimately, this note will conclude that disgorgement
by the government under the civil provision of RICO is improper.
A. Background, RICO
RICO was enacted under Title IX of the Organized Crime Act
of 1970.8 This legislation was the conclusory result of an effort to
penetrate criminal organizations that had plagued the United
States for many years. 9 Many of these organizations, most
notably the "Mafia," (specifically "La Cosa Nostra"), were able to
evade authorities because of their complex and non-conventional
operations.10 Furthermore, there was concern that these criminal
organizations had infiltrated the high ranks of legitimate
associations such as labor unions.1 1 In response, committees to
investigate these operations and ways to penetrate them were
established as far back as the 1950s in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.12
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970). For a detailed history of RICO's enactment and its
difficulties in becoming federal law, see Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative
Supremacy Approach to Federal Criminal Lawmaking, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 639-46
(2000).
9 Introducing RICO, Senator John L. McClellan, then-Chairman of the Criminal Law
and Procedures Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that "Title IX of
this act is designed to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business
by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from control of
legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering
methods." See 116 CONG. REC. 591, 602 (1970). The controversy over RICO derives, in
part, "from those who view RICO's legislative history as indicating a more limited purpose
for RICO than has occurred." Slocum, supra note 8, at 646-48.
10 See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-54 (1982) (examining proliferation of
organized crime in 1960s and 1970s and various efforts of U.S. Senate and Department of
Justice to move against racketeer infiltration of labor unions, government, and business);
see also Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11
World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1227 n.114 (2003) (noting "La Cosa Nostra is an
organization of Italian families who work together in ongoing criminal enterprises such as
gambling, murder for hire, drug trafficking, and extortion.").
11 See Nicholas Berg & Christopher Kelly, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1074 (2004) (noting "Congress originally
intended for RICO to be used by the government to combat the infiltration of organized
crime into labor unions"); see also Blakey, supra note 10, at 251-53 (stressing Department
of Justice's special concern with corruption of labor unions).
12 See Blakey, supra note 10, at 249.
In 1951, the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce
disclosed that there was an ongoing problem of organized crime infiltrating legitimate
business, state, and local government. In response to a request by the Chairman of the
Special Committee, Senator Estes Kefauver, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
established the ABA Commission on Organized Crime. In addition, the problem of
criminal infiltration into labor unions was fully documented over the next decade by the
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The RICO section of the Organized Crime Act involves both a
criminal and civil portion. The criminal portion 13 requires proof
of an "enterprise" engaging in two separate predicate acts defined
under the statute. 14 Generally, this was a more elastic standard
than previously demanded for prosecution under rigid criminal
statutes. 15 Among its language, in response, the statute itself
called for a liberal construal.16
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (the
McClellan Committee). By 1960, the McClellan Committee had revealed the corruption of
labor unions by criminal elements.
See Basil J. Musnuff, Note, Concurrent Jurisdictionover Civil Rico Claims, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1047, 1062 (1988). It was also able to later expose the Mafia's (La Cosa Nostra's)
national structure.
13 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). The criminal portion of the RICO section of the
Organized Crime Act provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2,
title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market
for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the
control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law
or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006) (stating, "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity"); see also
Slocum, supra note 8, at 642 (noting how under RICO '"pattern of racketeering activity' is
established when the accused commits at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten
years of one another").
15 See Carole Golinski, Recent Decisions: In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler, 46 ALA. L.
REV. 163, 169 (1994) (discussing use of "broad and unambiguous language of the RICO
statute"); see also Slocum, supra note 8, at 644-45 (noting broad nature of terms in RICO
statutes).
16 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970)
(exclaiming intention for liberal construal of RICO statute); see also Slocum, supra note 8,
at 645 (commenting on liberal construction clause Congress inserted into RICO statutory

2007]

SWHAT'S ALL THE RACKET?

In addition to the criminal provisions, RICO provides for civil
recourse, including prosecutorial remedies,1 7 both through the
Attorney General on behalf of the public,18 as well as personal
remedies.19 This section of the act has been the troublesome
portion.
Specifically, the contention arises within the
government's prosecutorial role in the civil section of RICO.20
The government has seldom used this provision to combat
legitimate organizations, especially for disgorgement purposes. 2 1
It has, however, increasingly begun to use it with hopes for
effectiveness in fighting corporate fraud. 22 This utilization
prompted the circuit split being examined by this note.
B. The Split
Though not the only cases where the government attempted to
scheme).
17 RICO statute's civil provisions vest district courts with authority to offer civil
remedies:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962] by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct
or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of
any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006).
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (2006) (stating "[The] Attorney General may institute
proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any
time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including
the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper").
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (providing "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962] may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
20 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
Dissenting) (arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 "district courts may impose any
equitable remedy for RICO violations"); see also U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1181-82 (2d
Cir. 1995) (interpreting language of 18 U.S.C. § 1964 "to prevent and restrain violations of
section 1962").
21 See Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 987, 1035-36 (2003) (noting government traditionally used civil RICO
provision to keep corruption out of legitimate organizations such as labor unions, more
recently though, it has used civil RICO against general practices of legitimate
organizations); see also Raymond P. Green, The Application of RICO to LaborManagement and Employment Disputes, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 309, 312-25 (1995)
(describing RICO prosecutions involving labor officials and unions).
22 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192-93 (discussing government's attempt at
disgorgement); see also Bryan et al., supra note 21, at 1037-38 (commenting on federal
government's RICO claim against tobacco industry).
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use the civil provision of RICO for disgorgement purposes, the
two that are discussed are the highest authority on this method
to date. The Second Circuit, through United States v. Carson,23
has allowed disgorgement in limited circumstances. 24 By
contrast, the D.C. Circuit, through United States v. Philip
Morris,25 has categorically denied this ability to the
government. 26
In Carson, the federal government prosecuted a past secretarytreasurer of the labor union, Local 1588 of the International
Longshoremen's Association of New York City.27 The government
alleged that Carson had engaged in racketeering methods
including embezzlement, kickbacks, extortion, and acceptation of
illegal gifts, which harmed the union's finances, and ultimately
the member's wages. 2 8 Various charges and reciprocal defenses
ensued, but the major question remaining was whether civil
RICO could be used to disgorge profits for his racketeering
actions. 2 9 The government sought, and the lower court awarded,
more than $60,000 from Carson's profits earned while in his
position. 30 Carson defended against the claim stating that civil
RICO disgorgement was improper and beyond the scope of the
statute. 3 1 Ultimately, the court rejected this defense and ruled
that the civil portion of RICO allows for government
disgorgement. 32 Its decision was founded primarily upon
principles of equitable discretion. 33 The court described the
23 See generally 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995).
24 See id. at 1181 (finding federal government's disgorgement remedies proper where
needed for equitable purposes).
25 See generally 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
26 Id. at 1201-02 (rejecting assertions that RICO disgorgement is proper due to
limited suggestions by legislative history).
27 See Carson, at 1176 (reciting relevant facts district court concluded upon).
28 Id. at 1177-78 (alleging misconduct subjecting defendant to RICO prosecution).
29 Id. at 1181 (acknowledging disgorgement through civil RICO was issue of first
impression for court, and thus, required close analysis).
30 See id. at 1180-81 (analyzing whether funds district court ordered disgorged were
consistent with what circuit court wished to accomplish).
31 Id. at 1181 (arguing for circuit court to interpret civil RICO provision narrowly and
reject disgorgement as available remedy).
32 See id. at 1181 (relying on guise of U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La
Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1442-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 879
F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (determining that RICO's legislative history allowed broad
equitable discretion from courts, accordingly finding disgorgement proper)).
33 See id. (claiming § 1964 confers equitable discretion on courts to enforce RICO
judgments).
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statute as allotting broad power to decide what sort of remedy
will carry out the fundamental goals of RICO.34 According to the
court, the only limitation was that disgorgement must be limited
to that which will "prevent and restrain" future RICO
misconduct as stated in the Act. 3 5
Between Carson and Philip Morris, the notion of disgorgement
under civil RICO was only tested in private litigation purposes. 3 6
In 2005, however, Philip Morris, provided a biting rejection of
Carson's interpretation of government initiated disgorgement
under Section 1964(a) of RICO.37 Beginning in 1999, the United
States brought suit against several cigarette manufacturers and
distributors alleging that they used fraudulent marketing tactics
to induce smoking among minors. 38 The original suit sought
recovery under three separate statutes including the Medicare
Recovery Act ('MCRA"),39 the Medicare Secondary Payer
Provision of the Social Security Act ('TISP"),40 and under the civil
provision of RICO.41 The government asked for more than $280
billion dollars to offset healthcare costs and compensate other
costs allegedly traced to smoking harms.42 The MCRA and MSP
34 Id. (discussing general concepts of disgorgement and equitable discretion).
35 Id. at 1182 (limiting breadth of civil RICO provision by allowing disgorgement only
to extent of preventing and restraining future RICO violations).
36 See Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2003)
(examining whether equitable remedy of disgorgement was proper for private litigation
according to RICO's civil provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)); see also Carson, 52 F.3d at 1181
(considering statute's conditions for disgorgement).
37 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1192-1202 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting
Carson's interpretation of government disgorgement); see also Current Circuit Split: Civil
Matters, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 147, 157 (2005) (discussing Phillip Morris's preclusion of
disgorging profits).
38 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192 (reviewing case's background and reasons for
allegations); see also Current Circuit Split: Civil Matters, supra note 37, at 157
(explaining suit was brought to recover health care expenditures for tobacco related
illnesses).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (2006).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
41 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192 (listing statutes used in government
allegations for recovery); see also Current Circuit Split: Civil Matters, supra note 37, at
157 (discussing Phillip Morris and the government's seeking disgorgement of profits
pursuant RICO).
42 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1193 (summarizing aggregate costs asserted by
government prosecutors allegedly traced back to smoking harms caused by tobacco
companies); see also Alan E. Scott, The Continuing Tobacco War: State and Local Tobacco
Control in Washington, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2000) (finding "the suit alleges
a long-standing conspiracy to defraud and mislead the American public about the health
effects of smoking, and seeks to recover the billions of dollars the federal government
spends each year on smoking-related health care costs").
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portions of the suit were dismissed during the first stage of
pleadings, which was affirmed by the circuit court. 4 3
The only remaining pre-trial question brought before the
circuit court involved the use of disgorgement by the government
under RICO if the case went to trial, which the government
sought to uphold. 44 The appellants, Philip Morris, first asserted
that disgorgement under civil RICO was antithetical to the
legislative purpose, and alternatively, if allowed, then should be
limited to an amount only necessary to "prevent and restrain"
future racketeering activities. 4 5 Ultimately, the D.C. circuit
46
agreed with the first argument established by the appellees.
Though the court regretted causing a split, it believed the issue
lacked any justification requiring it to follow Carson's
precedent.47
Most troubling, perhaps, for the circuit court in Philip Morris
was the lack of foundation upon which the allowance of
disgorgement was based. 4 8 The court found little solace in
arguments by the government regarding such a broad use of
equitable discretion. 49 In fact, the court relied upon the limited
jurisdiction of federal courts to find an opposite conclusion. 50 It
43 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192 (noting "District Court did dismiss the MCRA
and MSP claims, but allowed the RICO claim to stand"); see also U.S. v. Philip Morris,
116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D. D.C. 2000) (dismissing MRCA and MSP claims, but refusing
to dismiss RICO action, which was eventually brought before D.C. Circuit).
44 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192 (discussing lower court's unresolved questions
before circuit court regarding use of RICO for disgorgement); see also Philip Morris, 116
F. Supp. 2d at 155 (denying defendants' motion to dismiss RICO claims).
45 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1193 (arguing that in case of trial, disgorgement
should either not be allowed or at least be constrained to what Carson had advocated); see
also U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (disallowing disgorgement too far in
past to be part of effort to "prevent and restrain" any future racketeering activities).
46 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201-02 (agreeing with appellants' argument
against use of disgorgement under RICO's civil provision); see also Current Circuit Split:
Civil Matters, supra note 37, at 157 (declaring "court held 'that the language of § 1964(a)
and the comprehensive remedial scheme of RICO preclude disgorgement [of profits] as a
possible remedy."').
47 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201 (finding little foundation for Carson despite
expressing reluctance to cause circuit split); see also Current Circle Split: Civil Matters,
supra note 37, at 157 (commenting "[bly contrast, the court noted that the 2nd Circuit
holds that disgorgement is available under § 1964(a).").
48 See Philip Morris 396 F.3d at 1197 (finding text and structure of RICO provide
restrictions on remedies available).
49 Id. (distinguishing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), which
government used in its argument, in effort to expand equitable discretion in cases
regarding civil disgorgement under RICO).
50 Id. (following assertions from Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994), which asserted boundaries from which federal courts can draw their
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stated that their power is derived solely from the Constitution
and from federal statutes. 51 A textual look at the language under
the civil provision of RICO mentions nothing regarding
disgorgement,
nor
anything
suggestive
of retroactive
punishment. 52 Accordingly, the court found that it was
inappropriate to create an unintended method of action, which it
3
decided was against the wishes of Congress. 5
I.

JURISPRUDENTIAL

LIMITATIONS

The first limiting factors for the use of disgorgement by the
government under the auspices of civil RICO are jurisprudential
under the rule of law. Within this category there are three
different factors afflicting the legality of disgorgement, which
are: A) textual and structural; B) canonical; and C) causational. 54
A. Textual and Structural Limitations
This Comment is not concerned with the disputed harms
regarding tobacco; rather, it is concerned with the illegal acts
that any company may engage in, specific to each individual
trade. The civil portion of RICO, as stated in Philip Morris, does
not textually support the use of disgorgement as a remedy.55
Foremost, the use of disgorgement is not mentioned as a remedy,
so the only textual support it may garner is by inference.5 6
power).
51 Id. (using language from Kokkonen to support foundations of judicial power).
52 See id. at 1198 (interpreting civil RICO's language to mean that only forwardlooking remedies were justified).
53 See id. at 1202 (concluding appellee's arguments were without merit and
disgorgement was not available remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)).
54 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (stating right to
sue under RICO requires demonstrating both that without defendant's violation, harm
would not have occurred, and defendant's violation was proximate cause of injury); see
also R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 52
(1997) (explaining different views among formalists regarding which canons of statutory
construction are appropriate to adopt); David Kurzweil, Article, Criminal and Civil Rico:
Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretationand the Liberal Construction Clause, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 48 (1996) (discussing plain meaning rule).
55 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198 (finding civil RICO's vague language does not
suggest manipulation of construction for unspecified remedies).
56 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (lacking any explicit mention of disgorgement as
remedy); see also Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200 (noting plain meaning and
comprehensive scheme of statute leads to inescapable inference that Congress intended to
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Generally, the statute has been construed as vague and
amorphous. 5 7 The drafting of the statute was purposely left
vague so that prosecutors could adapt it to their individual
cases. 58 This construction was in an effort to thwart the evasive
organized crime epidemic, which had found ways to outmaneuver
rigid laws.5 9 Indeed, within the statute there was a call for a
liberal construal of its language. 6 0 However, this call for liberal
construal has been refused when courts have been faced with the
extension of RICO remedies. 6 1 Courts, like the D.C. circuit in
Philip Morris, have denied such lenity in their approach to civil
RICO.62 The liberal construal, according to courts and scholars,
was not intended to reach beyond enumerated and originally
intended remedies. 6 3 Rather, it was established to prohibit
narrow construal that would enable outsmarting of the criminal
justice system. 64
rule out disgorgement).
57 See Slocum, supra note 8, at 643-44 (construing RICO's background and
construction as vague and controversial); see also Jeffrey Standen, An Economic
Perspectiveon Federal CriminalLaw Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1998) (using
RICO as example of statute requiring greater precision).
58 See U.S. v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1976) (illustrating broad
allowance for criminal prosecution under RICO even when criminal prosecution had
generally been left to states); see also Slocum, supra note 8, at 645 (commenting on
RICO's liberal construal clause adopted by Congress at RICO's inception).
59 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)
(stating "[1]t is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime"); see
also Standen, supra note 57, at 288 (explaining different methods used by Congress in
Code reform).
60 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, (explaining provisions of title); see also
Philip Morris, at 1201 (discussing breadth of liberal construal clause).
61 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993) (rejecting broad extension of
RICO using liberal construal clause); see also Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201-06
(prohibiting disgorgement despite liberal construal clause).
62 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (noting "[tihis clause obviously seeks to ensure that
Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute, but it is not
an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended"); see also
Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201 (refusing to extend liberal construal of RICO beyond what
has been previously advocated, thwarting attempts to fuel further statutory ambiguity
with civil disgorgement).
63 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (ensuring liberal construal clause appropriately
implemented); see also Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201 (reiterating Reves's discussion
regarding breadth of liberal construal clause).
64 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (lamenting liberal construal clause is for deterring
overly narrow interpretation and was not added as invitation for creating new methods
and purposes); see also Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201 (stating there is no need to alter
language of statute to create new remedies).
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The civil portion of RICO, as a general method, has not been
vigorously disputed as a matter of recourse. 6 5 In fact, the
Supreme Court has considered this provision an important
remedial tool in cases where the criminal portion was
inapplicable or its burden impossible to meet. 6 6 The Supreme
Court in Sedima v. Imrex allowed a trial to go forth with a civil
charge under RICO, which may allot treble damages to a private
plaintiff.6 7 Increasingly, both the government and private
plaintiffs against legitimate businesses have used the civil
portions within RICO.68 The general use has been lauded, 69
however, the specific attempt at disgorgement by the government
70
has remained unpopular among most courts.
Bolstering the reluctance toward implying new methods of
remedy is the structural argument of RICO. The RICO statute is
comprised of several sections. 71 Aside from the definitions
portion, RICO begins with the criminal elements necessary for a
conviction. 72 The criminal portion prohibits a "pattern of
65 See H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (following language
from Sedima regarding civil redress under RICO); Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488
(1985) (ruling RICO does not require criminal conviction prior to civil remedy).
66 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 (reversing appellate decision against civil RICO
damages for private plaintiffs, deciding civil damages may be awarded despite lack of
criminal convictions under its predicate acts); see also H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236
(discussing Sedima's results).
67 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 (acquiescing to RICO's language allowing treble
damages to private plaintiffs who prove predicate acts).
68 See Diane Marie Amann, RICO Thirty Years Later: A Comparative Perspective:
Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organized Crime?, 27 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 199, 202 (2000) (recognizing myriad of newer cases brought under RICO,
especially applying to legitimate business rather than traditional criminal organizations);
see also U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (elaborating on term "enterprise" and
its connection to RICO conviction).
69 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 (recognizing civil RICO may be asserted when acts
alleged fall short of burden required in RICO's criminal provisions); see also One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. U.S., 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (distinguishing between
burden requirements in criminal and civil actions).
70 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend
civil RICO beyond remedies clearly intended); see also Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem.
Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.2003) (limiting remedies to specified
circumstances).
71 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006) (codifying RICO provisions); see also Richard L.
Bourgeois, Jr. et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 879, 880-82 (2000) (discussing criminal and civil provisions of RICO).
72 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 (2006) (explaining criminal elements and resulting
sanctions); see also Leslie G. Kanter, The Second Circuit Review--1984-1985 Term: Rico:
Rico's Unlawful Debt Collection Provision. Durante Bros. & Sons v. Flushing National
Bank., 52 BROOK. L. REV. 957, 959 (1986) (stating § 1962 "prohibits acquiring,
maintaining, controlling, conducting or participating in the affairs of an enterprise when
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racketeering activity" 7 3 occurring to further the interest of an
enterprise. 74 The civil provisions follow after both the criminal
elements and the resulting sanctions left to the courts' disposal.75
Though RICO is often considered a less elementally strict
approach at criminal law, the civil remedies have not been
received as openly. 76 This approach has been founded upon the
structure of the RICO statute. 77 Because the criminal portion of
RICO has its own limited disgorgement provision, any civil
violation that would warrant disgorgement should thus be held
to similar burdens as criminal violations are held.78 By explicitly
mentioning disgorgement as a remedy for criminal violation,
Congress did not intend for a similar remedy under the civil
portion, where the burden of proof is substantially lower. 79 The
structural distinction is comparable to other statutes, such as
accomplished through either a 'pattern of racketeering activity' or the 'collection of an
unlawful debt."'); Terrance J. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable
"Interests," and Procedural Due Process., 62 N.C. L. REV. 57, 69 (1983) (noting penalties
under § 1963 are severe, including $25,000 fines [not adjusted for inflation], twenty year
imprisonments, and forfeitures).
73 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006) (stating 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity").
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006) (spelling out prohibited activities under RICO, notably
those furthering enterprise interests); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (defining
"enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity").
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (following §§ 1962-1963, which address civil elements and
procedure for RICO); see also Blakey, supra note 10, at 241 (discussing right to sue
pursuant to § 1964).
76 See Amann, supra note 68, at 204 (documenting criticism of civil RICO for fear of
frivolous and uncontrollable litigation); see also Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 50001 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning path of civil RICO is gaining too much
momentum and getting far from its original intentions).
77 See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation:Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?,
77 TEMP. L. REV. 825, 869 (2004) (analyzing idea that other sections of RICO contain
explicit sanctions and thus unremunerated ones are not meant for addition); see also U.S.
v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting when Congress crafts
comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme like RICO, courts are reluctant to enforce
additional remedies).
78 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 869 (reiterating structural argument of RICO); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006) (placing strict procedural guidelines on RICO criminal
sanctions unlike under civil sections); 18 U.S.C. § 19630) (2006) (calling for notice
requirements before any RICO criminal disgorgement can occur).
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006) (discussing criminal sanctions, including stipulations
for criminal forfeiture if convicted of predicate acts under § 1962); see also Ausness, supra
note 77, at 869 (noting higher standard of proof required for criminal convictions and
'"permitting disgorgement under section 1964(a) would therefore thwart Congress's
intent").
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those regulating securities violations where any use of
disgorgement is an explicitly mentioned sanction.80 Ultimately,
tangible evidence of congressional intent for disgorgement under
civil RICO is sparse, and using canonical methods of
interpretation reaches similar conclusions. 8 1
B. CanonicalLimitations
Canonical paradigms are utilized to interpret construction of
statutes or holdings from cases, especially when there is no clear
textual reference. Two such paradigms are prevalent to the
topic: esjudem generis and equitable norms.8 2 The first is used
when a few purposes of a statute or methods of remedy are listed
as examples and a questionable remedy such as disgorgement
arises.8 3 This method suggests that a list within a statute defines
the breadth of allowance for inferential interpretations.8 4 Here,
there are a few suggested sanctions for appropriate civil
remedies, which have been surmised as: divesting interests,
imposing prohibitive restrictions on future activities, and
80 See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006) (stating that civil penalties will be added to
disgorgement fund); see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 875-76 (2003)
(explaining changes within Securities and Exchange Act promulgated by Sarbanes-Oxley
after large corporate scandals made disgorgement an explicit remedial application and
mandated express purposes for its use).
81 See U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (declining to enforce equitable
remedy of disgorgement under civil RICO because "jurisdictional powers in § 1964(a)
serve the goal of foreclosing future violations, and do not afford broader redress."); see also
Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1199 (refusing to interpret § 1964(a) as plenary grant of
equitable jurisdiction because would violate canons of statutory construction).
82 See Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988) (describing types of equitable
remedies); see also White Mem'l Med. Ctr. v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.
1981) (explaining standard rule of construction for esJudem generis statute is that
"general language refers only-to objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by
the specific words").
83 See Kelso, supra note 54, at 52 (admonishing maxim of esjudem generis "where
general words follow an enumeration of specific words, the general words are to be held as
applying only to the same general kind or class as the specific words"); see also R. Randall
Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
ConstitutionalInterpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 131-32
(1994) [hereinafter Styles of ConstitutionalInterpretation](explaining verbal maxims).
84 See Kelso, supra note 54, at 52 (discussing use of esJudem generis); see also Styles of
Constitutional Interpretation,supra note 83, at 132 (explaining that at its broadest level,
contextual interpretation can involve "totality of relevant factors in the general cultural
environment external to the specific language being interpreted that are shared by the
users of the language in the particular speech community and taken account of by the
particular communication").
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reorganizing the RICO enterprise. 85
Though the available listed remedies are left open for courts to
fill in any loopholes, the opportunity for them to do so is
limited.8 6 The remedies listed all share similar goals, which are
to "prevent and restrain" future RICO acts by the enterprise as
enumerated in the act. 8 7 The goals here differ from those in
statutes that are more clearly understood to allow for
disgorgement. 88 For example, many securities violations statutes
explicitly call for disgorgement and have frequently been
understood as a proper method for deterring that category of
crimes. 8 9 Even though Carson ultimately allowed for
disgorgement, it too limited the allowance to amounts measured
to prevent and restrain future acts. 90 For that reason, the circuit
court remanded the case back to the district court. 9 1 The remand
was to ensure that the disgorgement of profits was a careful
orchestration, not taking anything further than necessary to

85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (stating remedies available when statute is violated); see
also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893 (listing possible equitable remedies, which can take variety of
forms).
86 See Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,
537 U.S. 371, 383-84 (2003) (following esjudem generis, meaning similar methods confine
itself, as a maxim that cannot be ignored when interpreting statutory language); see also
Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (explaining canons of noscitur a
sociis that terms should be understood in context).
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (stating that "[tihe district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter...");
see also Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quoting RICO's language limiting remedies to methods preventing and restraining
violations).
88 See SEC v. First City Fin., Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(assimilating violations of § 13(d) of Securities Act of 1934, requiring filing from anyone
owning more than 5% of company equity, with insider trading violations, which clearly
support disgorgement as penalty); see also SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir.
1987) (explaining, '"primary purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate investors.
Unlike damages, it is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he
was unjustly enriched."').
89 See First City, 890 F.2d at 1230 (declaring, "[d]isgorgement is an equitable remedy
designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others from
violating the securities laws."); see also SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985)
(noting, "[o]nce the Commission has established that a defendant has violated the
securities laws, the district court possesses the equitable power to grant disgorgement
without inquiring whether, or to what extent, identifiable private parties have been
damaged by ...fraud").
90 See U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1181-82 (2d Cir. 1995) (limiting equitable
remedies to preventing and restraining RICO violations).
91 See id. at 1182, 1190 (remanding back to trial court for final judgment on
damages).
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accomplish this goal. 9 2 Even Carson recognized that broad
allowance of disgorgement for any ill-gotten gains under the
statute would require another word added on, making it
"prevent, restrain, and discourage." 93 Other courts following the
Carson precedent have done so to limit disgorgement to specific
94
profits that will prevent and restrain future acts.
Emboldening this category of possible remedies are canons of
equitable remedies. 95 Axiomatically, equitable remedies are
limited to orders where both legally sanctioned damages are
inadequate and equity has commonly been utilized. 9 6 Equity
generally
embodies
injunctions,
reorganization,
specific
performance, and accounting. These remedies are designed to
prevent the continuation of harmful actions. 9 7 On the other hand,
restitution type equity, like disgorgement, is usually only
awarded in cases where the intention is to return affected parties
to the status quo. 98 Civil RICO is intended for private suits for
those personally affected by such activity, and civil relief for the
government where criminal sanctions are either unattainable or

incompatible with the acts committed. 99 Disgorgement and
92 See id. at 1182 (explaining court was seeking "determination as to which
disgorgement amounts... were intended solely to "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations").
93 Id. (noting extension of applicable phrase "would allow any remedy that inflicts
pain").
94 See Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2003)
(following Carson precedent regarding limits on ability to disgorge profits); see also U.S. v.
Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. 895, 900-01 (E.D.N.Y 1996) (analyzing
effect of Carson and following its limits on disgorging only profits calculated to prevent
and restrain future Racketeering acts).
95 See Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (claiming restitutional equity is limited to
returning parties to status quo); see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402
(1946) (creating canons of equity including limits on restitutional remedies). But see
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398-99 (interpreting equitable discretion broadly and allowing
disgorgement as remedy).
96 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 321-22
(1999) (following general practice of equitable remedies and further requiring that
remedies at law must first be exhausted); see also Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306
U.S. 563, 568 (1939) (noting that principals of equity arise from the English Court of
Chancery).
97 See Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988) (defining equitable remedies as those
with specific relief for returning victims to status quo); see also Polanco v. U.S. DEA, 158
F.3d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing present claim from legal remedy despite being
monetary claim).
98 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (quoting Porter,328 U.S. at 402, and noting disgorgement
is only for restitution); see also Porter, 328 U.S. at 402 (explaining restitution lies in
equity).
99 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964
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restitution may be awarded within the confines of some statutes
as an equitable remedy to establish the status quo, but only
when no other legal or sanctioned civil remedy is available. 0 0
With RICO, by contrast, there are specific, forward looking,
equitable sanctions available, such as divestment,101 when
appropriate. 102
Moreover, it is well-founded that the language of civil RICO is
meant to restrain racketeering activities from occurring in the
future.10 3 Disgorgement by its nature, however, is a backward
looking remedy, and is thus incompatible with the statutory
intentions. 104 Likewise, disgorgement is awarded regardless of
whether it will prevent and restrain. The goal of disgorgement is
rooted in returning to the status quo.lO5 By structuring RICO
with the criminal section first and then specifically mentioning
equitable options, equitable norms suggest that Congress did not
intend for disgorgement under the civil relief section. 106
Furthermore, equitable remedies are limited because federal
(2006) (providing civil remedy for injured parties); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 865
(deciphering civil RICO as limited to its explicit text).
100 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23 (separating monetary damages awards from
equitable claims meant to establish status quo); see also Kelly v. U.S. EPA, 203 F.3d 519,
523 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining civil sanctions are meant to punish, rather than return to
status quo).
101 The RICO statute specifically states that a court may order a person to divest
himself. 42 U.S.C. § 1964(a). Divestment, by nature, is a method by which one's control
over property may be reduced. This is an action used to "prevent and restrain" future
RICO action because it reduces control over a racketeering enterprise. Contrastingly,
disgorgement is aimed at replenishing funds lost by retroactively taking back profits. See
U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)) (providing
listed civil remedies sufficient to quell broader equitable remedies); see also Christopher
Paul Dean, Comment, Davidson v. Microsoft Corporation: Reexamining Maryland's
Illinois Brick Bar Against Indirect Private Purchasers,33 U. BALT. L. REV. 69, 84 (2003)
(examining case holding that disgorgement could not be used absent statute's express
permission).
103 See Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir.
2003) (noting RICO is meant to prevent future conduct); see also U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d
1173, 1181-82 (2d Cir. 1995) (confining equitable remedies to preventing and restraining
RICO violations).
104 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1192 (noting disgorgement is aimed at past
violations); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 869 (exploring dichotomy between forwardlooking and backward-looking remedies).
105 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198 (stating disgorgement is quintessentially
backward-looking); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 869 (explaining disgorgement is
awarded regardless of intent to prevent and restrain, rendering such relief an equitable
remedy incompatible with RICO's plain meaning).
106 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198-99 (examining goals of RICO); see also
Ausness, supra note 77, at 869 (commenting on aggregation of RICO disgorgement cases).
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courts are of limited jurisdiction.107 Accordingly, cases that are
brought under a federal statute in the federal court system may
not be approached broadly; instead, they must be approached
with deference to the statute's language and with canonical
norms. 108 It is understood that federal courts may utilize broad
equitable discretion, but it must be founded upon specific
language granted to it within statutory language. 0 9 In Carson,
much of the equitable discretion was founded upon Porter v.
Warner Holding Co.,110 which called for a large allocation of
equitable discretion to courts. 1 l However, the Porterholding was
based upon the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 ("ECPA"),
which used more acquiescent language than RICO.112 The
language of ECPA mentions few remedies and specifically defers
broad judgment to district courts, while RICO lists specific
remedial possibilities. Although RICO does not explicitly limit
107 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (noticing federal
courts' limited jurisdiction and how they are bound by power authorized to them in
Constitution and other statutes); see also In re Al Fayed, 91 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140 (D. D.C.
2000) (highlighting rebuttable presumption that cause of action lies outside federal courts'
power, and burden of rebutting presumption rests upon party asserting jurisdiction).
108 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (discussing federal courts' power may not be
"expanded by judicial decree"); see also Citibank v. Swiatkoski, 395 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (suggesting unconstitutionality of federal courts hearing cases outside
their jurisdictions).
109 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (stating breadth of use for court's equitable
discretion); see also Citibank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (noting limited jurisdiction of United
States Court for the Eastern District of New York in light of powers granted to it by
Constitution and other statutes).
110 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
111 See id. at 398 (calling for federal courts' broad and absolute discretion to fashion
appropriate equitable remedies to create full justice).
112 See Emergency Control Price Act of 1942 ("ECPA"), 50 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1946)
which states in pertinent part:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any
provision of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an
order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such
provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is
about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond.
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006), which declares:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962] by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct
or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of
any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
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itself to those remedies, it does call for a common theme of
specified categories." 3 Carson itself admits the lack of support
from the statute regarding its interpretation of equitable
powers.ii 4 The broad interpretation in Carson was thus
incompatible with the power granted in Porter and beyond the
legal limits of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."i 5

C. CausationalLimitations
The last moor of jurisprudential interpretation is that there
must be a firm causal link between the party being sued and the
injury for an award of damages.116 Although there have been
arguments to the contrary, there is no causal link to the
government in these disgorgement cases like there are in the
criminal ones.
Foremost, a party suing must have proper standing for a suit
to exist and proceed."i 7 Plaintiffs are granted standing in some
civil suits as their role is clearly mentioned within the statutory
113 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (allowing remedial measures such as "ordering a person to
divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise ... imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person [and] ... ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons"); see also Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Uniform Limitations Period for
Civil RICO, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 495, 510-11 (discussing how courts have
characterized RICO claims in three ways: underlying predicate acts, remedy, and
statutory origin).
114 See U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir. 1995) (declaring, "plain reading of
the statute does not support the broad interpretation adopted by the district court and
urged by the government").
115 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (providing for limited equitable discretion under civil
RICO allowing methods for preventing and restraining future conduct); cf. ECPA, 50
U.S.C. § 205 (granting broader authority for equitable remedies, which was foundation for
Porter's ruling); see also U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(distinguishing allowance of equitable discretion in Porter from what is allotted under
civil RICO).
116 See Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d
Cir. 1999) (declaring there must be "but for" and "proximate" causation to sue under
RICO); see also In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 663 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (noting plaintiffs can only recover if 'compensable injury necessarily is the harm
caused by the predicate acts").
117 See John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court
Takes The Racketeering Requirement out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 824-25
(showing many courts have held standing requirements for private civil RICO suits
requiring racketeering injuries, rather than just injuries from predicate acts); see also N.
Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (requiring
plaintiff to show RICO injury).
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language of civil RICO.118 RICO was purposely made flexible in
regards to proof of causation so that the government and private
plaintiffs are able to disrupt stalwart racketeer groups. 1 19
However, plaintiffs do not have a legal right under the language
of civil RICO to pursue any claim they feel is proper simply
because there has been an injury.12 0 Similarly, the government
may not use RICO as a pretext to pursue broad quests for
repayment in the name of public service.121 Though RICO was
extended beyond just criminal sanctions, they were the root of its
creation; thus, the civil portion was intended to mimic the
criminal portion by requiring a civil plaintiff to at least show
they suffered a racketeering injury rather than normal harm
22
from a predicate act.1
For the government to recover for injuries there must be a

118 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (allowing Attorney General to sue on public's behalf); see
also United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356,
362 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting how plaintiffs may assert that "they or one of their members is
a RICO enterprise or part of a RICO enterprise" and thus are not prohibited from
"including themselves in a legitimate, albeit infiltrated, enterprise and has not been
interpreted to limit RICO enterprises to those persons engaged in the illegal conduct").
119 See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968) (1970) (codifying liberal intention of act in order to keep criminals from further
circumventing judicial enforcement); see also Michelle Sacks et al., Twentieth Survey of
White Collar Crime: Article: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 825, 827 n.7 (2005) (citing two Supreme Court cases asserting liberal
construction of RICO).
120 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993) (asserting RICO causes of
action are limited to those that reflect Congress's intent when enacting statute, by stating
liberal construction clause of RICO was "not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes
that Congress never intended."); see also Kendel Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 279 (2005) (asserting absent showing of
elemental prerequisites for corporate criminal law of "acts, omissions, or failures of an
agent acting within the scope of his employment," may inculpate innocent parties); Adam
J. Homicz, Note, Private Enforcement of Immigration Law: Expanded Definitions Under
RICO and the Immigration and NationalityAct, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 621, 626 (2005)
(emphasizing that injury alone is insufficient because three elements of RICO standing
include not only injury to business or property, but also violation of RICO predicate act
through pattern of racketeering and proximate causation of alleged injury by defendant).
121 See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating RICO is
primarily aimed at organized criminal activity); see also Koenig, supra note 117, at 831
(necessitating proper predicate acts characteristic of organized crime to ensure causation
is sought in proper organized racketeering cases rather than just ordinary fraud).
122 See Homicz, supra note 120, at 626 (proffering in order to have standing, plaintiff
may act under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 by meeting 18 U.S.C. § 1962 requirement of a violation of
a RICO predicate act through a pattern of racketeering); see also Koenig, supra note 117,
at 866-68 (suggesting plaintiffs under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, that is, civil RICO, must show
racketeering acts that further an enterprise like that in criminal RICO, and showing only
pure injury from a single predicate act does not establish causal links to civil RICO).
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causal link established to the injuries.12 3 The criminal portions of
RICO were created to enable the government to act as an agent
of the public to disrupt criminal organizations, and occasionally,
12 4
legitimate industries infiltrated by racketeering acts.
Meanwhile, the civil portion of RICO allotted to the government
is meant to relax some of the burden for the government as a
25
plaintiff, and is thus limited in its allowance of remedies.1
Criminal disgorgement requires the burden of beyond a
reasonable doubt for each element.126 For any type of divestment
to take place under civil RICO, burdens of proof are lower, as are
causation requirements.12 7 Understanding the possibility for
uncontrolled civil prosecution, Congress limited the remedies so
that the government did not have the ability to disgorge funds,
8
but could still "prevent and restrain" illegal activities.12
The government often attempts to sue as an agent of the public
for events it believes have drained public money and created
harms. 12 9 This motive, however admirable, was not what was
123 See Labors Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229,
234 (2d Cir. 1999) (highlighting RICO's intent regarding proximate causation between
party and harm); see also Homicz, supra note 120, at 626-27 (stating plaintiff in RICO
suit, whether government or private party, must establish proximate cause of alleged
injury).
124 See Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture:An HistoricalAnalysis of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 92 (2001) (recognizing civil forfeiture is
methodology for private rights and remedies, or government regulation unlike criminal
forfeiture used on behalf of society by government); see also Michael A. DiMedio, Note, A
Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO Liability for "Fraud in the Sale of
Securities" 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 140-41 (1994) (noting Congress enacted criminal
RICO to address problem of organized crime and added civil RICO as compliment to
protect legitimate businesses).
125 See Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly
Restrictive and MechanicalApproach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina,2004
BYU L. REV. 739, 754 (2004) (explicating general understanding that RICO was designed
as "expansive and sweeping" tool for criminal justice); see also Sacks et al., supra note
119, at 864 (remarking on Supreme Court's assertion that Congress intended civil RICO
to be construed broadly).
126 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 94 (differentiating burdens of criminal forfeiture
and civil forfeiture); see also Wesley M. Oliver, A Round Peg in a Square Hole: Federal
Forfeiture of State Professional Licenses, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 205 (2001) (indicating
that criminal forfeiture requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
committed crime in question).
127 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 94 (referring to civil forfeiture as "quick and easy"
because of its low burden of proof); see also Morris, supra note 125, at 791 (commenting on
how civil provisions of RICO provide a very broad standard for many plaintiffs to redress
racketeering claims).
128 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006).
129 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 864 (discussing government suits on behalf of
public); see also Moin A. Yahya, Can I Sue Without Being Injured?: Why the Benefit of the
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intended under RICO.130 Due to the fact that RICO requires only
relaxed elements, it does not mandate the government to
establish what harms are attributable to each individual act. 13 1
Recognizing this, Congress has instead established statutes
specifically creating a causal link requiring specific elements
from the government. 132 Among these statutes are the Medicare
Recovery Act ("MCRA")133 and the False Claims Act.13 4 These
statutes, among others, are specific to each type of injury that the
government may sue under for disgorgement.13 5 The purpose of
these enactments was to make sure that proper burdens of
causation were met rather than using blanket attempts at
recovery under statutes like RICO, which are remedially
limited.136
An additional limitation is the requirement of a causal link to
the property upon which disgorgement is asserted.137 Even when
Bargain Theory for Product Liability is Bad Law and Bad Economics, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 83, 84-85 (2005) (reviewing large tort claims founded upon public interest).
130 See U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (stating RICO was designed to
"seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by... establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime"); see also Ausness, supra note
77, at 864 (commenting on how RICO was enacted to combat infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate business enterprises).
131 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229,
239-40 (2d Cir. 1999) (understanding damages should not be awarded without specific
causal links); see also Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative Assessment, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 335 (2001) (noting issue of whether "epidemiological evidence
established a causal link between smoking and a variety of diseases from which members
of the class suffered" in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co).
132 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 837-38 (listing statutes with explicit statutory
causal link under which government can sue and collect damages); see also Morris, supra
note 125, at 740 (analyzing strict test courts use to establish proximate causation under
RICO).
133 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006); see Ausness, supra note 77, at 864 (showing MCRA's
explicitly established causal link between government and those defrauding Medicare).
134 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006); see Aaron M. Altschuler et al., Health Care Fraud,35 AM.
CRIM L. REV. 841, 845 (1998) (explaining federal False Claims Act and its ability of
damage collection because of statutorily created causal link).
135 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 864 (declaring acts with explicitly allowed use for
government disgorgement); Barnet, supra note 124, at 97-98 (clarifying that there are
over 150 federal acts explicitly allowing forfeiture and disgorgement); see also Altschuler,
supra note 134, at 842-46 (explicating each individual element within federal acts and
describing their specificity).
136 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006) (casting wide approaches used to disrupt
organizations involved in racketeering acts); see also Altschuler, supra note 134, at 84246 (connecting each health care statute to its causal links and how they may be used in
connection with illegal acts).
137 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992) (establishing
standard of proximate causation necessary to attach compensation for an injury to RICO

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:3

a civil remedy is allowed, it must be limited to what will prevent
and restrain future acts. 1 38 Otherwise, the government could
easily assert unjustified claims simply to get as much damages as
possible.1 39 If unfettered, the government would be allowed to
use loose connections to establish large rewards, which
precedence would cause to spiral out of control; thus there must
be minimum standards like in the criminal portions.140 Even a
private party suing under RICO, or any average tort claim, must
show cause for the damages pursued.141
Emblematic of the call for specificity in such a large-scale suit
was the holding in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of NJ v. Philip
Morris USA Inc. 142 That case involved an appeal of a suit by a
large health insurance group suing tobacco manufacturers for
misleading the public as to the health risks involved with
smoking.143 The plaintiff, Blue Cross, sued to recover money
allegedly lost from paying for complications resulting from their
clients smoking.144 The suit was brought under various legal
theories including civil RICO. 145 To establish a causal connection,
the plaintiff sued by subrogation on behalf of their members.14 6
defendant); see also SEC v. Unioil, 951 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing "touchstone of a disgorgement calculation is identifying a causal
link between the illegal activity and the profit sought to be disgorged").
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006) (providing "district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter"); see
also Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quoting language from RICO statute limiting remedies to methods that prevent and
restrain violations).
139 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69 (using axiom of law that there must be proximate
causation to prevent abuse, and prosecution for general misfortune); see also Senah
Elizabeth Green, Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the
Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U. L. REV. 561, 598-605 (1985)
(discussing dangers of excessive damages under RICO in corporate setting).
140 See Drew & Clark, supra note 120, at 278 (factoring minimum requirements
needed for criminal conviction of corporations); see also Green, supra note 139, at 604-05
(arguing treble damages under RICO is unnecessary for deterrence and courts should
reject application of vicarious liability against corporations under the statute).
141 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (holding plaintiffs right to sue under the Clayton Act
"required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his
injury, but was the proximate cause as well"); see also Drew & Clark, supra note 120, at
298 n.160 (quoting Delaware Chancery ruling that directors may be liable for "losses
caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards").
142 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003).
143 See id. at 216-17 (reviewing plaintiffs reasons for bringing original suit).
144 See id. at 216 (briefing factual background for suit).
145 See id. (listing suit's legal foundations).
146 See id. at 216-17 (outlining subrogation method used as suit's foundation).
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The district and circuit court both held that a health insurance
company could bring a civil RICO claim by subrogation.14 7
However, the damages awarded by the district court were
significantly reduced at the appellate level because the plaintiff
did not show with specificity the names or any individualized
information regarding the subrogors.14 8 The decision of the
circuit court thus hinged on the need for specific causal links in
order to recover.149 Due to fear of abuse, the standard of
causation is rather strict even for a private plaintiff.150
Though the government's intentions are often in pursuit of
justice, the RICO statute has limitations that were meant for
following.151 RICO was specifically designed to disrupt criminal
organizations and not as a chance for the government to
replenish funds improperly taken or swindled from them.152 The
civil portion was only intended to allow disruptive practices on
corrupt organizations rather than full disassembly.153 The
intended limits were not created abstractly; these reasons are
both policy and practically oriented and shall be explained in the
forthcoming sections.
II. POLICY LIMITATIONS
RICO's absence of civil disgorgement was not abstractly meant
to limit the government. Policy considerations, as in all
legislation, were considered before enactment. With RICO, using
147 Id. at 217 (allowing, generally, for subrogation use in RICO suits if there is proper
foundation).
148 Id. at 217-18 (reducing damages for remoteness of causal connection).
149 See id. (necessitating stronger causal connections for award of damages).
150 See id. at 217-18 (emboldening necessity of strong causal connection); see also
Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 240-41 (2d
Cir. 1999) (outlining policy reasons demanding strict causation requirement).
151 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating "structure
of RICO . . . limits courts' ability to fashion equitable remedies"); see also Ausness, supra
note 77, at 869-70 (discussing RICO's inherent limitations).
152 See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200 (explaining civil RICO was implemented to
thwart future conduct which in no way entails separating criminals from their previous
ill-gotten gains); see also Barnet, supra note 124, at 86-87 (reviewing problems associated
with too much government power to forfeit assets).
153 See Slocum, supra note 8, at 643-45 (analyzing unclear language of civil RICO
and its possibility for government abuse); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory
Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's Remedial Provisions., 43 VAND. L. REV. 623,
627 (1990) (explaining how RICO civil remedy combined with lawyers' ingenuity has lead
to its use in unintended situations).
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civil disgorgement as an enforcement tactic, though arguably a
deterrent, causes more harm than good.15 4 The three policy
reasons for limitation are: A) it harms innocent third parties; B)
it is too penalizing; and C) there are better deterrents.
A. Innocent Parties
The first policy interest for barring civil disgorgement under
RICO is to keep third parties from undue harm.155 Third parties
include workers, investors, creditors, and consumers, among
others.15 6 Legitimate businesses continue to exist because they
depend on others as others depend on them for their "going
concern." 15 7 Certainly, in every industry there are ordinary risks
involved, which can be knowingly factored by a third party.158
However, when outside parties are unaware of misconduct, they
are harmed automatically even before devastating events like a
stock-value plummet. 15 9
If the government was to come in and simply disgorge funds,
154 See Dan K. Webb & Scott F. Turow, White Collar Crime:RICO ForfeiturePractice:
A ProsecutorialPerspective, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 404, 419 (1983) (remarking that some
RICO forfeitures are "disconcerting"); see also Rasmussen, supra note 153, at 623
(detailing calls for RICO's change).
155 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (arguing large public litigation causes
economic harms to corporations being pursued, as well as, others); see also Larry
DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38
AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 679-80 (2001) (explaining some economists feel penalty clauses are
inefficient).
156 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (describing where much of burden of public
litigation falls); see also DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 679 (stating litigation and penalties
affect third parties).
157 See Richard A. Booth, Theory Informs Business Practice: Who Owns a Corporation
and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 175 (2001) (identifying "going concern" as
fundamental to business practice); see also Shu-Yi Oei, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of
Bankruptcy Courts Over Post-Confirmation Federal Tax Liabilities: Towards a New
Jurisprudence of 11 U.S.C. 505, 19 AKRON TAX J. 49, 64 (2004) (stating "ultimate
viability" of a business is "going concern").
158 See Booth, supra note 157, at 154-56 (discussing regular risks involved with
business decisions); see generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts., 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (noting
shareholders' allocation of risk of corporate torts).
159 See Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, "Ain't No Glory in Pain". How the 1994
Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributedto the
Collapse of the United States CapitalMarkets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 990 (2005) (reviewing
fallout harms from major market collapses); see also Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, The
IntegrationConundrum: DebilitatingFailuresof the Securities and Exchange Commission
Must Be Addressed as U.S. Corporate Malfeasance is "Getting Serious, So Serious", 48
WAYNE L. REV. 1305, 1384 (2003) (concluding corporate malfeasance harms unwitting
investors, leaving investors "stunned").
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not only would the business itself likely collapse, but all those
tangentially involved would be harmed as well.16 0 A business
entity may gain money by misconduct of its officers, but that
money ultimately becomes part of the corporation, which is
comprised of many co-tangled facets.161 Creditors await money
from corporations, while investors expect that what they invested
will still exist or at least have a fair chance to gain.X62 When
misconduct occurs within a board or select people, those who are
not involved cannot handle loss beyond the fallout of a
scandal.16 3 When the government disgorges money for
misconduct, it is in turn disgorging from those creditors and
investors. 164 Subsequently, the inextricably linked corporations
all suffer.165
For the very concern of innocent third parties, Congress passed
the long awaited Civil Assent Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA")
in 2000.166 This statute codified the confusing realm of civil
forfeiture, but provided for a robust innocent owner defense.1 6 7
The government does not want to give up the possibility of
160 See Larry DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 679-80 (arguing excessive penalties affect
many more than just wrongful acting corporations); see also Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable
Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 243 (1981)
(arguing penalties in general may not be justified because of effects on third parties).
161 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (discussing effects of public tort litigation
upon society); see also DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 683-84 (reviewing general economic
theory and how excessive penalties harm society and industry).
162 See DiMatteo supra note 155, at 680-81 (discussing externalities of enforcement);
see also John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPS: A
CriticalAnalysis of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDP Debate After Enron,
and Recommendations for Other Jurisdictions;8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN L. 151, 192
(2003) (citing Enron as example where investors lost significant portions of savings
because they depended on company's "growth potential").
163 See DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 680-81 (understanding enforcement may cause
unnecessary harm); see also Rubin, supra note 160, at 243 (arguing that penalties are
unduly harmful to third parties).
164 See DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 680-81 (acknowledging extent of enforcement
and fallout of harm); see also Rubin, supra note 160, at 243 (arguing penalties may injure
non-parties to litigation).
165 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (arguing that public enforcement of
corporate malfeasance has unintended negative consequences upon, among others,
manufacturers and consumers); see also DiMatteo, supra note 155, at 680-81 (noting
extent of externalities).
166 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000).
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (establishing rules governing civil forfeiture, including
innocent owner defense); see also Judge Spatt, Decision of Interest; Eastern District; $21
Million Forfeiture Entered for Fraud, Money Laundering Facilitatedby Building Housing
Business, 234 N.Y. L.J. 22, Oct. 14, 2005 (enumerating areas of civil forfeiture CAFRA
was intended to address).
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forfeiture and disgorgement, but it strives to keep innocent third
parties from being harmed.16 8 The statute thus provides for
special adjudication to collect property before the government
may forfeit it. 169
Moreover, even when ordinary damages are awarded,
companies need to make up for those expenses. Ultimately, the
costs burden the everyday consumers, which include lower-class
and indigent people.170 For example, after a large settlement
with gun manufacturers, consumers began having to pay much
higher prices so that the gun manufacturers could continue to
exist.171 Sometimes this is an intended strategy because the
government wants to keep people from buying certain items;
however, as explained, corporations do not exist in a vacuum,
and prices go up with interrelated products, services, and
goods. 172
B. Harsh Penalties
Just as third parties will be harmed in the event of
disgorgement, those involved within the company are also
harmed.
Among those are regular stockholders and
employees.1 73 Disgorgement under RICO is overly harsh and
168 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 106-07 (explaining CAFRA, unlike other statutes,
guards against injury to innocent third parties); see also United States v. 392 Lexington
Pkwys, 386 F. Supp.2d 1062, 1071 (D. Minn. 2005) (stating, "[u]nder CAFRA, [c]laimants
may... prov[e] that they are innocent owners of the property and, in that case, the
property is not subject to forfeiture").
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (providing procedure for government to attempt to preserve
its property); see also Barnet, supra note 124, at 104-05 (highlighting historical
background for providing innocent owner defense).
170 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 900 (demonstrating how litigation costs are passed
on to consumers through example where cigarette smokers were compelled to pay fortyfive cents more per pack due to tobacco industry's settlement); see also Scott H. Jenkins,
Letters, THE AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 7, 1996, at Editorial (asserting litigation costs
consumers billions of dollars).
171 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 909 (explaining where manufacturers cannot afford
to pay settlement costs, consumers are charged higher prices); see also Thomas E. Nugent,
Rear-End Realities, NAT'L REV., Mar. 3, 2006, at Nat'l Rev. Online (stating just as gun
litigation affected costs to consumers, public torts litigation against automobile
manufacturers will likely have similar results).
172 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 100 (showing while forfeiture law was intended to
target Mafiosi and drug-lords, such legislation instead adversely affected innocent
individuals); see also Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-ChicagoEconomics
Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 809 (2001) (explaining when goods are tied to
each other sales drop).
173 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 99-100 (lamenting that forfeiture and
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punitive because it harms the corporate entity, which itself has
not done harm.174 The majority of instances involve smaller scale
problems than are seen in cases like Enron; mainlydiscrete
occurrences by conniving officers. 1 75 The business entity, in the
United States, is fungible and can be fundamentally changed
with minimal damage to innocent workers, stockholders, and the
basic capital.176 Board members may be removed, or voted out
77
and replaced by people with completely different philosophies.1
Thus, when board members engage in misconduct, they can be
removed and replaced with honest, law-abiding members who
78
can change the company policy.1

The ability for a company to change and redeem itself becomes
difficult when the government forces forfeiture of large quantities

disgorgement burden third parties because legal fiction focuses on property rather than
individuals); see also Leslie Bender, Frontier of Legal Thought III. Feminist (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities., 1990 DUKE L.J.
848, 894 n.126 (1990) (stating in mass torts employee benefits plans might be cut to
compensate victims).
174 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 95 (asserting inanimate objects cannot be
culpable); see also Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the law in the era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1377 (1998) (opining attribution of social or moral
responsibility on corporations is fundamentally erroneous, as corporations are nothing
more than contractual relationships among various individuals).
175 See John Clemency & Legrande Smith, CorporateFraud: Where Should the Buck
Really Stop? CorporateFraud Perspective 2002, 21-Nov. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2002)
(writing that corporations' controlling officers are responsible for fraud, and despite many
instances of fraud in smaller corporations, such information rarely makes national
headlines); see also Carolyn Said, Stock Fraud Lawsuits Down; Stanford Study Finds
Fewer ClassActions in '05, Less Focus on Tech, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 4, 2006,
at C1 (explaining numerous frauds are so minor they have not drawn media attention).
176 See George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal for
Increasing ShareholderParticipationin Corporate Governance, 49 ALA L. REV. 673, 67476 (1998) (discussing history of shareholder voting, and explaining that Rule 14(a) of SEC
enables shareholders to take control back from management); see also Harvey R. Miller &
Shai Y. Waisman, Does ChapterII ReorganizationRemain a Viable Option for Distressed
Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 182 (2004) (describing
corporate assets as fungible).
177 See Kobler, supra note 176, at 687 (providing arguments for shareholder
participation and ability to remove board members); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Symposium: Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:
Executive Compensation & Takeovers: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 880 (2002) (giving particular
example of how ability to replace board members affects corporations).
178 See Kobler, supra note 176, at 687 (explaining stockholder participation will deter
board members from unethicil and lawless conduct, such as giving themselves excessive
compensation increases); see also Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing
Shareholder Participationin Corporate Governance: Too Little, but not too Late., 43 AM.
U.L. REV. 379, 432-33 (1994) (enumerating various positive outcomes of board
accountability to shareholders).
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of the company's assets. 17 9 In some situations, forfeiture is
proper and thus statutes like RICO call for divestment as long as
it conforms to the statutes' standards.180 Moreover, heightened
demonization jeopardizes future performance. 18 1 Large scale
disgorgement provides crippling blows to a corporation.
Accordingly, businesses develop an extra stigma as a RICO
"enterprise" and less as one that committed a few nefarious
acts. 182 Under RICO, if criminally pursued, it would be a double
penalty, the first coming from criminal disgorgement, followed by
civil.' 8 3 Also, there is the possibility of facing state sanctions as
well as federal.1S4 Essentially, disgorgement is penalizing, a
feature unintended in RICO's civil provision.185
Fundamentally, disgorgement causes greater externalities
than it solves problems. In fact, in many instances, large orders
of forfeiture ultimately cause a reverse effect: companies
continue illegal acts to meet the mounting court order.1 8 6 Once
179 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:Essays: From Morals
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization,54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 769-71 (2005) (objecting
to federal forfeiture in addition to state forfeiture for crimes because it causes too much
harm to defendants); see also Sacks et al., supra note 119, at 853-54 (2005) (stating RICO
actions traditionally do not violate double jeopardy clause of 5th Amendment).
180 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1995) (suggesting divestment as possible penalty in
proper circumstances); see also Sacks et al., supra note 119, at 863-64 (stating such
penalties are appropriate to halt activities that may lead to future violations, but courts
must be mindful of how penalties will affect innocent parties).
181 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (discussing adverse economic effects of
costs to corporations above just disgorgement including legal fees, image salvaging, and
stock deflation); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV.
239, 291 n.276 (1999) (stating that stigma attached to companies involved in crime may
lead consumers to steer away from its products).
182 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 909 (noting that high profile cases can negatively
effect companies' sales, profits and stock prices); see also Jost & Davies, supra note 181, at
291 n.276 (discussing possible consumer tendency to stay away from products produced by
companies involved in criminal action).
183 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006) (requiring criminal forfeiture of property obtained
by criminal transactions); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006) (providing divestment of any
personal interest one has in the enterprise).
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (granting forfeiture to federal government "irrespective of
any provision of state law"); see also Beale, supra note 179, at 770-71 (commenting that
double penalty occurs when both state and federal disgorgement are allowed).
185 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 104-05 (stating that forfeiture law can be unfair
and that CAFRA does away with archaic legal fictions); see also John J. O'Donnell, RICO
Forfeiture and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment?, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1101, 1111 (1988) (describing procedural advantages in RICO civil actions, over
criminal actions, including lesser burden of proof and more generous discovery disclosure,
for reaching defendant's property).
186 The RICO civil portion was not authored as a penalizing method of law
enforcement. It was enacted to prevent and restrain future acts of racketeering. See U.S.
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the disgorgement orders are made, states will become reluctant
to enforce them properly because they depend on tax revenue
from corporations, especially tobacco, alcohol, and gun
distributors.18 7 As a result, because the lawsuits are government
sponsored, the payment agreements, which are set up like excise
taxes, will depend on more sales instead of less.18 8
Though attractive to disgorge large amounts from major
corporations, the focus is better spent on prosecuting individuals
at the helm of the scandals. Corporations, though considered a
person for purposes of law and taxes, are merely a fictitious
entity controlled by people.1 89 There is thus a need to harshly
prosecute the individuals, including any rank and file members
that were involved.19 0 When the corporate chain is pursued, the
corporate veil can be pierced, and will no longer be regarded as a
comforting shield.191 Once criminal proceedings have been
brought against individuals, and funds forfeited against them,
there should be no reprieve including debt relief.192 Criminal
v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. 895, 900-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In fact,
section 1964 does not even authorize the government to recover all of the losses incurred
by the wronged parties, reaffirming RICO's purpose: to "prevent and restrain" future bad
acts. See U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (1995).
187 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 903 (finding settlements often create unforeseen
externalities); see also Margaret A. Little, Symposium: A Most Dangerous Indiscretion:
The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2001) (summarizing in-depth studies of Master Settlement
Agreements between states and tobacco industries, finding them "collusive and anticompetitive").
188 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 903 (referencing "master settlement agreement" of
1998 with tobacco companies and their ineffective structure); see also Little, supra note
187, at 1169 (noting payment of tobacco settlements with states come from raised prices,
which is essentially a hidden tax imposed by government).
189 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20 (personifying corporate entity); see
also Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 864 (emphasizing importance of officer roles in
daily conduct of corporations, despite lack of mention of these roles in corporate statutes).
190 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (describing prohibited conduct under RICO, which
covers a multitude of acts and can apply to all persons involved in conspiracy); see also
Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20 (tracking prosecution down corporate chains).
191 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 25 (positing new "scienter-actus" test
for imposition of liability of down corporate hierarchy for fraud); see also Kellye Y. Testy,
Case Studies in Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: Capitalism and Freedom For Whom?: Feminist Legal Theory and ProgressiveCorporateLaw, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 87, 105-06 (2004) (decrying lack of corporate accountability occasioned by limited
liability concept of corporations).
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006) (excepting from discharge in bankruptcy any
debt incurred in violation of securities fraud laws, or incurred as result of common law
fraud, deceit or manipulation attendant to purchase or sale of any security); see also Amy
Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and Clients'
Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1090 (2005) (noting non-dischargeability of debts
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suits and suits for tortuous conduct should be brought against
the individual actors even when their acts were benefiting the
entire corporation. 19 3 However, going after corporate funds
instead of individuals' funds will prolong the individual
provocateurs' sense of immunity. 194
C. Better Policy
Though both criminal and civil RICO have been important
tools for fighting organized crime, there are much better policies
that can be utilized against corporate misconduct than civil
disgorgement. The first group involves private actions, mainly
corroborative ones. 19 5 Derivative lawsuits have long been a
tactful way to ensure that a company is being run properly.19 6
Because those that bring the suits are shareholders, they are
more likely to have a grasp on the contours of the corporation
than
government prosecutors. 19 7 Furthermore, when a
incurred as result of violations of securities fraud laws).
193 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20-21 (delineating occasions for
imposition of personal liability on corporate officers, directors, and employees for frauds of
the corporation); see also Gary W. Marsh & Petrina Hall, The Many Faces of Directors'
Fiduciary Duties, 22-Sept. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 54 (2003) (noting recent precedent
suggesting willingness of courts to impose personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty
even absent suggestion of self-dealing); Keith A. Rowley, The Sky is Still Blue in Texas:
State Law Alternatives to Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 192-93
(1998) (categorizing when officers and directors may have suit brought against them for
wrongs committed within course of duty).
194 See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53
DUKE L.J. 517, 567 (2003) (noting "prospect of significant personal liability for corporate
failures would create strong incentives for directors to monitor management closely."); see
also Gregory Walker, Note, The PersonalLiability of Corporate Officers in PrivateActions
Under the Sherman Act: Murphy Tugboat in Distress., 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 912
(1987) (noting in context of federal antitrust law that officer immunity from personal
liability for adverse judgments would occasion the view of such judgments as mere
business expense).
195 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 226-27 (1983) (noting
efficiency and fairness advantages of private law enforcement); see also Matthew C.
Stephenson, Public Regulation of PrivateEnforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005) (enumerating arguments as to why
private suits against corporate misbehavior are a better enforcement mechanism).
196 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 888-89 (emphasizing significance of
private shareholder derivative suits allowed generally under state corporation laws); see
also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Face of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749-50 (2004) (extolling virtue of derivative suits).
197 See Reinier Kraakman, et al., When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733-34 (1994) [hereinafter Shareholder Interests?]
(explaining shareholder suits); see also Stephenson, supra note 195, at 107 (arguing that
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shareholder suit is won, money awarded is used to spread the
wealth among the corporation, maintaining its steadiness. 19 8
Largely important as well is that these suits serve as deterrents
to corporate officers against improper action. 199 This deters
individuals more strongly than the thought of RICO
disgorgement because they know that shareholders are
constantly watching and are vigilant to protect their holdings. 20 0
Meanwhile, the derivative suit often increases general corporate
wealth, while disgorgement simply drains it.201
Further, there are more appropriate statutes that provide
issue specific remedies, including fines and forfeiture, but
carefully pinpoint what is targeted and where the retrieved funds
vest. MCRA, fraud acts, and other related legislation are specific
and proven ways to help pay for harmed public entities as a
result of corporate misconduct in the health care industry. 20 2
Likewise, statutes, such as insider trading statutes and
disclosure acts, specifically aim to prevent insider trading. 20 3
Securities exchanges are closely monitored by the Securities and
private suits are often more efficient and innovative with litigation strategies than most
public prosecutions).
198 See ShareholderInterests?, supra note 197, at 1736 (analyzing how shareholder
suit can affect corporation); see also Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate
Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1156 n.131 (1998) (noting beneficial effect on share value as
result of successful derivative suit).
199 See James D. Cox, American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project:
Remedies: Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit
Procedures., 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 749 (1984) (noting deterrent effect of derivate
suits); see also Shareholder Interests?, supra note 197, at 1736 (prophesizing that
derivative suits can act as strong deterrent to corporate misconduct).
200 See ShareholderInterests?, supra note 197, at 1735-36 (establishing incentives of
shareholders to increase corporate wealth and deter officers from harming their
investment); see also Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in
Arkansas, 52 ARK. L. REV. 353, 354 (1999) (extolling "watchdog function" of shareholder
derivative suits).
201 See Cox, supra note 199, at 749 (positing theory that derivative suits may be
economically justified inasmuch as they reduce corporation's agency costs); see also
Shareholder Interests?, supra note 197, at 1739 (determining when derivative suits
increase corporate wealth).
202 See Altschuler, supra note 134, at 844-45 (reviewing usefulness of various
statutes for their prosecutorial options); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care
Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 591-630 (1996) (canvassing federal legislation
directed at curbing health care fraud).
203 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1995) (requiring strict disclosure of any change in
ownership of five or more percent of corporation within ten days of exchange); see also
SEC v First City Fin., Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating disgorging
profits obtained in violation of disclosure statutes is regular practice and seeks to relieve
violators of unjust enrichment).
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Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which is specifically capable of
targeting ill-gotten profits, and does so with small margins of
error. 2 04 RICO, meanwhile, is a broad and vague statute. 20 5 It is
asserted that if disgorgement is allowed, there will inevitably be
many mistakes regarding how the funds are calculated and
where they will go. Meanwhile, due to the lack of specific
limitations, it would result in unplanned externalities harming
unintended people.
III. PRACTICAL
RICO has been effective for the purposes it was created to
battle with; but for practical reasons, it should be limited as far
as civil penalties are concerned. Beyond jurisprudential and
policy based reasons, disgorgement without specific intent to do
so is an impractical approach. 20 6 Primarily, civil RICO was set up
with proactive provisions to "prevent and restrain" organizations
from any further illegal acts. 2 07 Although anger at corruption in
business stirs public sentiment to punish the corporation that is
responsible, there are more practical methods with fewer
externalities. 2 08 These two methods include: A) proactive
involvement; and B) a shift in responsibility.

204 See First City, 890 F.2d at 1231-32 (lamenting SEC's ability to proactively
investigate disclosure violations and efficiently trace unjustly gained profits); see also
William C. Tyson & Andrew A. August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has the Balance
Tipped in Favor of Incumbent Management?, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 76-77 (1983) (noting
that Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain antifraud
provisions and reporting disclosure provisions).
205 See Slocum, supra note 8, at 643-44 (describing RICO as vague); see also Edward
S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice., 43 VAND. L. REV.
651, 661 (1990) (commenting on broad operation of RICO).
206 See generally First City, 890 F.2d at 1230 (questioning practicality of using RICO
disgorgement); see also Stephenson, supra note 195, at 126-29 (offering more practical
solutions to keeping corporate misconduct quelled).
207 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d '1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reiterating
limitations of using civil RICO methods); see also Geoffrey F. Aronow, In Defense of
Sausage Reform: Legislative Changes to Civil RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 964, 974-75
(1990) (noting targets under RICO extend to variety of white collar crimes, including
fraud).
208 See Slocum, supra note 8, 645-46 (explaining some negative effects of a broad
RICO interpretation); see also Stephenson, supra note 195, at 126-29 (suggesting that
delegation to executive agencies is more practical than using broad equitable solutions).
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A. ProactiveMeasures
Often, government suits seeking large-scale retribution mimic
misinformed, unfounded public sentiment. 2 09 Most corporate
scandals are small and receive little public attention. 2 10 The ones
that do, however, gather much momentum in the media. 2 1 1 The
constant coverage heightens public ire, and from this angst
comes politics. 2 12 An ideal example is the Philip Morris case. 2 13
There has been a lot of political charge and, therefore, pressure
from lobbying groups, Congress, and some presidential
administrations to fight the tobacco companies. 214 Within this
public campaign, however, the proper policy reasons become
1ost.215 Disgorgement, though seemingly victorious, often creates
many externalities created with political chits. 2 16 Thus,
retroactive civil retribution is often an impractical matter.2 17
209 See Tyson & August, supra note 204, at 972-73 (suggesting reason Congress
enacted RICO was due to pressure from Justice Department); see also Aronow, supra note
207 (exemplifying Congressional intent for civil RICO and how that contrasts to public's
use of statute).
210 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20 (showing most corporate scandals
occur with little spotlight and large fallout); see also Paul E. Coffey, The Selection,
Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035,
1039-42 (1990) (suggesting in many corporate cases RICO charge is not used until late in
investigation so as not to draw much public attention).
211 See Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 26
AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 199-201 (2000) (discussing momentous lawsuit brought against
tobacco manufacturers by government); see also Aronow, supra note 207, at 964-65
(commenting on public attention focused on defendants indicted under RICO).
212 See LaFrance, supra note 211, at 199-200 (noting political involvement in liability
issues regarding tobacco companies); see also Aronow, supra note 207, at 965 (explaining
initial cases brought under civil RICO were in center of controversy).
213 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
214 See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the
Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 483-89 (1999) (outlining
three waves of tobacco litigation); see also LaFrance, supra note 211, at 200 (commenting
on source of government decision to prosecute tobacco companies for fraudulent
marketing methods).
215 See LaFrance, supra note 211, at 202-03 (questioning whether motives for
lawsuits against tobacco companies are rooted in policy or monetary gain); see also Donald
W. Garner, Tobacco Wars and the New Minority, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 15, 31
(1998) (suggesting policy alternatives to penalty-producing litigations merely result in
tobacco companies passing penalty costs on to tobacco consumers).
216 See LaFrance, supra note 211, at 200 (claiming suits against tobacco companies
wrongly utilized disgorgement as insurance for items paid for by federal government); see
also Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Wars: Will the Rule of Law Survive?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POLW 45, 49 (1998) (calling federal litigation against tobacco industry perversion of rule of
law in order to "tap the deep pockets of a feckless and friendless industry").
217 See LaFrance, supra note 211, at 201 (examining three obstacles to just results
from tobacco litigation undertaken at federal level: "political clout of the Congressional
delegations from the tobacco growing states, the lobbying expertise of the companies and
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Proactive measures, therefore, often work better because they
are undertaken by entities, such as administrative agencies, that
have more experience within a particular field.218 Moreover,
there is less political sentiment intermingled with regulatory
agencies than with elected officials publicly calling for corporate
rebuke. 2 19 Agencies, such as the SEC, have utilized their
regulatory tools for over seventy years. 2 20 Their efforts at
disclosure have prevented widespread corruption. 22 1 As a result,
many improper corporate activities have been isolated incidents
or smaller scale problems. 2 22 Indeed, corrupt individuals will
always find a way to manipulate laws, which is why deferential
proactive
regulation
is
more
legislation
to
promote
2
23
appropriate.
In contrast, wide-scale, retroactive disgorgement
usually proceeds when certain methods of corruption are no
longer in use. 2 24 Furthermore, in the wake of a scandal, it is
the subsidy self-interests of the tobacco growers"); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at
900-201 (observing settlement payments and divestments often become entangled in
political gain and are thus counterproductive).
218 See Stephenson, supra note 195, at 171-72 (arguing executive agencies should
have greater authority to allow private rights of action for violation of federal laws); see
also Steven D. Shermer, Article, The Efficiency of Private Participationin Regulating and
Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J.
ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 463 (1999) (asserting, "[I]deally, involving citizens in the
regulatory process would actually reduce the need for enforcement actions by either the
government or citizens").
219 See Stephenson, supra note 195, at 97-98 (arguing executive agencies are better
suited to grant private rights of action because they possess superior information, can
alter policies, and adapt more readily); see also Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen,
Costs and Benefits of Private Participationin WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It
Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 241 (2003) (noting that placing cause of action in hands
of private individuals acts to hold government accountable for its commitments).
220 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin., Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(reviewing SEC's substantial task and giving general deference to its wisdom and
congressionally granted power); see also Shermer, supra note 218, at 467 (noting that once
Supreme Court allowed private right of action for environmental claims, environmental
legislation flourished).
221 See Joel Seligman, The SEC at 70: A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2005) (discussing SEC requirements implemented to
promote corporate disclosure); see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 872-75 (noting
SEC's disclosure requirements).
222 See Seligman, supra note 221, at 1159-60 (positioning Enron as isolated example
of impetus for greater SEC regulating corporate governance); see also Thompson & Sale,
supra note 80, at 887-90 (highlighting results of corporate governance litigation).
223 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 861-62 (discussing positive future for
securities regulation with federalization of corporate regulation); see also Seligman, supra
note 221, at 1164 (recounting SEC response to Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate
scandals).
224 See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting
Norms of Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1233 (2005)
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likely that there is no longer any money to disgorge; rather the
2 25
effort is a political stunt.
Another reason that retroactive punishment is futile is that
judicial economy is often inadequate. 2 26 Courts are ill-equipped
to figure out exactly what funds were part of the racketeering
scandal. 2 27 Even if the funds could be perfectly traced, it is even
more difficult to figure out which funds will "prevent and
restrain" further activities. 2 28 Communication with every third
party that will be affected is impossible and thus judges may,
though unintentionally, create further harm. 22 9 Though some
who lost money may be compensated with the disgorged funds,
many will end up harmed because of limits on judicial
remedies. 23 0 A further difficulty with judicial economy is the
inadequacy of jurisdiction. 23 1 Most large-scale scandals come
(positing that to extent upper management's influence is responsible for corporate
misdeeds, upper management should bear penalty of corporate wrongdoing); see also
LaFrance, supra note 211, at 200 (discussing disgorgement as penalty imposed against
tobacco company over period of years).
225 See Greenwood, supra note 224, at 1233-34 (arguing desirability of punishing
corporate management for corporate misconduct rather than punishing lower level
corporate wrongdoers merely carrying out orders); see also LaFrance, supra note 211, at
203 (proposing broad new tobacco policy as superior solution to monetarily penalizing
tobacco companies through awards won in litigation).
226 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 191 F.3d 229, 24041 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing court's own limits and inability to properly calculate
disgorgement that would address proper policy concerns); see also Berg & Kelly, supra
note 11, at 1075 (2004) (discussing tobacco related RICO claims).
227 See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 241-42 (acknowledging court's own limitations
in properly awarding damages while avoiding externalities); see also R.I. Laborers' Health
& Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 99 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D. R.I. 2000) (acknowledging
difficulty in ascertaining damages).
228 See U.S. v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (reiterating need for
punishment to prevent and restrain further activities); see also Bourgeois, supra note 71,
at 940 (stating disgorgement was meant "solely to 'prevent and restrain' future RICO
violations").
229 See Holmes v Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. 503 U.S. 258, 273 (1992) (noting difficulty
in fashioning remedy for an indirect claim); Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239-40
(realizing claims for disgorgement were entirely speculative, and thus court with limited
capacity could not implement effective policy).
230 See Barnet, supra note 124, at 103-05 (cautioning use of forfeiture because of
ability to harm third parties if they are not given proper process under innocent owner
defense); see also Jonathon Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian
Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 463 (2000) (suggesting difficulty in predicting
future implications from civil RICO applications).
231 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 839 (commenting on circuit court's holding that
disgorgement is not within RICO's grant of jurisdiction); see also Kyle Rex Jacobson,
Doing Business With the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose
Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L.
REV. 167, 200-01 (2005) (noting difficulty in bringing foreign-based companies to justice
when they have committed wrongful acts).
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from multi-national corporations who have spread their assets
worldwide. 2 32 Not only does this add to the difficulty of forensic
accounting, it keeps much of the ill-gained profits out of reach of
United States' Courts. 23 3 Instead, it is important to allow
agencies with the capital, manpower, and expertise to handle
corporations before the chance for scandal occurs. 234 The
agencies, furthermore, often have strong relationships with
international organizations, which can help prevent surreptitious
2 35
transfers of funds.
Tantamount to proactive involvement is the need to create and
manage a different corporate atmosphere. 2 36 Instead of waiting
for scandals to occur and then trying to set an example, the
example should be set earlier. 2 37 Currently, corporate law is
generally followed because it is on the books, 23 8 but compliance is
as narrow as legally permissible. 2 39 This mindset is known as
232 See Keith Aoki, Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders: (Intellectual) Property
and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1293, 1346 (1996) (discussing transnational influence held by multinational corporations
through global wealth); see also Jacobson, supra note 231, at 200-01 (noting that most
large multinational corporations have immense global influence).
233 See Aoki, supra note 232, at 1346 (suggesting corporations selectively choose
which laws to comply with based on corporate interests); see also Jacobson, supra note
231, at 210-11 (noting difficulty for prosecuting individuals not subject to jurisdiction
because of lack of actual knowledge).
234 See Jacobson, supra note 231, at 227-28 (acknowledging that much of
international cooperation is achieved through comity); see also Wendy W. Wolfe, Note:
Holmes v SecuritiesInvestor Protection Corporation:A Warning to Legitimate Business, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 679 n.163 (1994) (noting multiple non-governmental organizations
who have taken an interest in the civil RICO statute).
235 See Helesa K. Lahey, Twentieth Survey of White Collar Crime: Article: Money
Laundering, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 699, 703-04 (2005) (reviewing statutory standards in
tracing illegal transfers of funds); see also Walter Perkel, Note, Money Laundering and
Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 183, 186 (2004)
(discussing attempts to curb money laundering through international cooperation).
236 See Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A CorporateExecutive's Social
Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 561 (2004) (explaining
"Corporate Social Responsibility" and its mere normative status); see also C.A. Harwell
Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the
Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 80 (2002) (suggesting need for reform of
corporate power schemes).
237 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 564-65 (calling for corporate behavior to follow
standards of cooperation with spirit of public policy); see also Wells, supra note 236, at 122
(favoring focus on public policy over private interests).
238 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 566-67 (arguing many corporate policies are set up
to comply with regulations simply because they are legally compelled to do so); see also
Williams, supra note 174, at 1317 (suggesting it may be permissible as normative concept
of law for corporations to violate law and simply pay regulatory fee).
239 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 566 (asserting most organizations follow laws with
literal interpretation, construing them narrowly); see also Williams, supra note 174, at
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malum prohibitum, which means that people find something
wrong only because a law says it is wrong. 2 40 By contrast, malum
in se is a belief that something is inherently evil and followed
because society views it this way. 24 1 There needs to be a
proactive measure aimed at shifting the paradigm of compliance
from malum prohibitum to malum in se. 2 42 Without this,
disgorgement is merely a temporary and poorly executed
solution.

243

Though a giant shift in thinking may take time, agencies and
2 44
legislation aimed at such do alter the spirit of corporate norms.
It is largely important to create a web of stability in corporate
society that encourages respect for the law rather than reluctant
compliance. 24 5 Some companies have voluntarily followed this
positive ideology. 2 46 Also, fear of public and government threats
has influenced the stock exchanges to engage in more selfregulation. 24 7 They have created internal standards aimed at
1295 (stating, "some law prices behavior).
240 See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear Off the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1571 (1997) (defining malum prohibitum); see also Ostas, supra note 236, at 575-76
(describing malum prohibitum as corporate standard for following regulations, merely
following text of laws).
241 See Green, supra note 240, at 1571 (defining malum in se); see also Ostas, supra
note 236, at 571-77 (urging corporate atmosphere to change and adopt malum in se
policies, which would transform culture into following spirit of regulation).
242 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 575-76 (asserting businesspersons have duty to
examine moral basis of laws); see also Williams, supra note 174, at 1276 (arguing that
corporations should comply with substantive standards of behavior and law).
243 Unless organizations begin following the spirit of laws, disgorgement will not cure
problems. Instead it will simply delay further problems. See Ostas, supra note 236, at
561-62. Disgorgement, may not affect underlying behaviors. See Anish Vashista et al.,
Twentieth Survey of White Collar Crime: Article: Securities Fraud,42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
877, 929 (2005).
244 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 565 (urging paradigmatic shift for compliance); see
also Williams, supra note 174, at 1300 (stating "clear societal consensus" over morality of
particular behavior should dictate corporate action).
245 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 562 (explaining view that businesspersons should
accept general ethical ideas as guide for behavior); see also Drew & Clark, supra note 120,
at 278-79 (noting federal attempt to effect changes in corporate governance).
246 See Drew & Clark, supra note 120, at 297 (arguing incentives are given to those
corporations who diligently follow internal policies aimed at rooting out corruption, which
some have followed); see also Lucci, supra note 1, at 212-13 (giving examples of
companies that have made internal efforts to root out improper corporate behavior).
247 See Seligman, supra note 221 at, 1178 (describing Boston Stock Exchange as
exchange that has taken internal, proactive methods to change corporate industry in
order to impede misbehavior); see also Takayuki Usui, Corporate Governance of Banking
Organizations in the United States and in Japan, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 581 (2003)
(remarking that much legislation could have been avoided had institutions adopted
meaningful self-regulation and standards of corporate governance prior to government

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:3

changing mindsets so that there is a general respect for corporate
law. 2 48 Importantly, by doing so, the corporate climate works to
comply with the spirit of law instead of working to outmaneuver
it.249 RICO disgorgement instead pays little attention to teaching
lessons. 25 0 Because it is so vague, much of what is disgorged has
little to do with the actors who created the scandals. 2 5 1 Instead,
the corporations and all who rely on it are harmed; thus, beyond
2 52
fear, few lessons are learned.
Similarly, proactive measures need strength both through
more legislation
or
stronger
endorsement
from
law
25
3
enforcement.
None of the aforementioned measures are
productive without robust legislation and manpower needed to
enforce them. 2 54 Much of the problem in the past was the
antiquated thought that past enforcement measures were
involvement).
248 See Seligman, supra note 221, at 1177 (speaking of meaningful dialogue necessary
to fund healthy governance); see also Corporate Governance Bulletin, Devil is in the
Details of Post-Enron Legislation, Recommendations, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY
RESEARCH CENTER INC., May 2002 (reflecting on need to align management and
shareholder interests so that corporate law is followed).
249 See Ostas, supra note 236, at 567 (alleging that to abate all corporate
misbehavior, there must be shift in internal corporate policy aimed at working
cooperatively); see also Williams, supra note 174, at 1325 (arguing companies must
comply with regulatory law precisely because it aims at covering situations not generally
seen as intrinsically evil).
250 See Amann, supra note 68, at 204 (enumerating criticisms of RICO, including
attraction of treble damages that "has spawned frivolous and inappropriate civil suits"
and blending of civil and criminal RICO which permits civil defendants to be branded
with stigma of criminal behavior); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (reviewing
adverse economic effects of overly eager prosecution and how such prosecution inevitably
harm wrong people).
251 See Amann, supra note 68, at 202 (maintaining that RICO has been called elusive
and unconstitutionally vague); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (positing that
though manufacturers being sued by the government face most immediate economic
burden, ultimately that burden will be disseminated to consumers through price increases
and to the public as a whole who will be required to pay more to finance government
services).
252 See Amann, supra note 68, at 199 (explaining that three decades after its birth,
RICO's efficacy remains in question); see also Ausness, supra note 77, at 908 (noting
public tort litigation imposes economic costs "upon manufacturers and their shareholders,
as well as upon employees, suppliers, retail sellers, consumers, and the general public.").
253 See Karl E. Stauss, Indemnification in Delaware: Balancing Policy Goals and
Liabilities, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143, 167 (2004) (positing that Sarbanes-Oxley is
illustrative of current state of federal law which is headed in direction of proactive
approaches to governance); see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 861-62
(acknowledging need for strong proactive legislation in wake of corporate scandals).
254 See Lucci, supra note 1, at 231-33 (reviewing recent major changes in federal
corporate regulation with advent of Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Stauss, supra note 253,
at 167 (citing major shift in federal enactments towards more proactive measures, as
highlighted by Sarbanes-Oxley).
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adequate. 2 5 5 The allowance for prosecuting misconduct is not the
problem; rather, methods of stopping it earlier need
strengthening and enacting. 2 56 An example of bolstering
enforcement methods is to fervently prosecute acts used to
conceal misconduct such as document shredding and altering. 2 57
Traditionally, corporate regulation has been a state issue. 2 58
Thus, RICO disgorgement has recently been attempted when
state enforcement has failed and the federal government is
suddenly desperate to get back lost money. 2 59 With the spread of
corporate influence
country-wide,
and in some cases
internationally, federal agencies must be allotted power to take
more proactive measures. 26 0 Because much of the proactive
legislation is rather infantile, it needs time to develop and prove
itself.2 6 1 There has already been a shift in corporate practice and
255 See Lucci, supra note 1, at 244-45 (discussing shifts to incorporate American
government into corporate regulation and concluding that such shifts were necessary to
fill regulatory gap that emerged between professional responsibilities of auditors and
lawyers worldwide); see also Stauss, supra note 253, at 171 (predicting federal legislators
will continue to seek proactive approaches to dealing with corporate governance because
such approaches are necessary to police corporations effectively).
256 See Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies
and Federal Obstructionof Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 729 (2003)
(citing need for federal obstruction of justice statutes as necessary to protect honor and
integrity of federal proceedings); see also Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step
Away from the Shredder and the "Delete"Key: §§ 802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (2004) (discussing need for legislation concerning acts
used for concealment, trickery, and "obstruction of justice").
257 See Chase, supra note 256, at 729 (explaining creation of new obstruction of
justice provisions through Sarbanes-Oxley, including general anti-shredding law and
retention of audit work papers law); see also Grindler & Jones, supra note 256, at 68-69
(describing provisions within Sarbanes-Oxley Act that call for stricter punishment for
those concealing documents and engaging in other forms of illegal conduct).
258 See Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (holding that corporations
are "creatures of state law"); see also Seligman, supra note 221, at 1169 (stating that
traditionally, corporate governance was considered to be within province of state
legislation).
259 See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (exemplifying
government's use of RICO as last effort for relief); see also G. Robert Blakey, Symposium
Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO: Foreward, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 873, 876 (1990) (commenting that RICO was meant to be liberally construed but was
not meant to displace other bodies of law and can also supplement penalties imposed by
state law).
260 See Lucci, supra note 1, at 244-45 (highlighting need for government regulation
with worldwide corporate influence); see also Stauss, supra note 253, at 167 (describing
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 as illustrative of new proactive approach within
government).
261 See Lucci, supra note 1, at 214-15 (describing amount of government legislation
that was not enacted until 2002, after Enron scandal); see also Thompson & Sale, supra
note 80, at 861-62 (describing outpour of suggested reforms and legislation, targeted at
expanding role of federal law, that followed in wake of Enron and WorldCom scandals).
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more shall come along. 26 2 Thus, power must be acquiesced to
these proactive measures away from those seeking retroactive
punishment. 26 3
The advent of corporate legislation has recently begun to shift
towards greater federal regulation. 2 64 The first great change is
that federal agencies such as the SEC have been given a role in
regulating corporate governance; a role traditionally left to
states. 2 65 Accordingly, they have a greater role in deciding how
much power shall be concentrated in a single CEO or board of
directors. 26 6 The last major area of policy change has been the
shift of responsibility to people running corporations and
stripping away the protective veil that allowed so many to go
267
unpunished.
B. Responsibility Shift
Broad disgorgement from a legitimate organization demonizes
that organization rather than holding the individuals running
the organization accountable. 26 8 Instead of holding those
262 See Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance after Enron and Global Crossing:
Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 737 (2003)
(describing new corporate governance schemes focusing on the increased role of the board
of directors); Lucci, supra note 1, at 221 (discussing regulatory "changes in the corporate
arena.").
263 See Stauss, supra note 253, at 167 (recognizing current trend towards proactive
federal regulation as evidenced by Sarbanes-Oxley); see also Stephenson, supra note 195,
at 121 (arguing for explicit congressional delegation to reduce inconsistencies).
264 See Lucci, supra note 1, at 221 (recognizing fundamental shift of power); see also
Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 861-62 (discussing recent innovative shifts of power
to regulate corporations).
265 See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization"
to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate
Law: A Defense of SarbanesOxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 725 (2005) (recognizing
expansion of federal regulation of corporate governance under Sarbanes-Oxley); see also
Lucci, supra note 1, at 221 (emphasizing shift of corporate governance from state to
federal regulation in many important areas).
266 See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O.Douglas - The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 79, 80-81 (2005) (recognizing SEC's increased power to regulate the structure of
corporate boards); see also Seligman, supra note 221, at 1177 (considering separation of
powers between CEO and corporate board in order to maintain positive regulation).
267 See Colin P.A. Jones, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Inch-Thick Contract, 5 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 5 (2005) (recognizing new legal obligations on CEO and CFO); see
also Lucci, supra note 1, at 216 (recognizing necessity of strengthening punishment
against individual actors).
268 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (arguing broad disgorgement causes
demonization of corporate entity, causing irreparable harm); see also John S. Baker, Jr.,
Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
310, 353 (2004) (stating "[w]hatever theory or approach one adopts to justify corporate
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responsible for racketeering acts, the entire entity suffers
including those who were completely unaware of any wrongdoing
and relied on the organization's stability. 26 9 For this reason, in
the wake of Enron and other similar scandals, Congress passed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.270 This legislation was the first major
attempt at removing the corporate veil that had shielded
wrongdoers for a long time. 27 1
The new legislation requires, among other things, that a
publicly traded corporation's Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer personally endorse a professional audit in the
company's annual reports. 2 72 Consequently, this requirement
places a much larger legal burden on those officers to review
reports and make sure that everything is stated correctly. 27 3 This
effort lifts away the hackneyed defense of ignorance. 2 74 When all
parties claim that they were unaware of the improper
accounting, the criminal mens rea falls apart and forces
prosecutors to use broad civil measures. 27 5 When this measure is
criminal liability, one cannot escape from the reality that corporations are being punished
without regard for culpability.").
269 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (recognizing adverse economic effects of
disgorgement); see also Baker, supra note 268, at 353 (arguing that claiming corporation
is culpable "for the acts or omissions of its officers, directors, or employees dispenses with
mens rea").
270 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
codified in 15 U.S.C. §7201, et seq. (stating purpose of Act "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes"); see also Lucci, supra note 1, at 214-15
(reviewing birth of Sarbanes-Oxley as a reaction to corporate scandals like Enron).
271 See Jeffrey R. Escobar, Note, Holding Corporate Officers Criminally Responsible
for Environmental Crimes: Collapsing the Doctrines of Piercing the Corporate Veil and the
Responsible Corporate Officer., 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT. 305, 334
(2004) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as "statutory codification" of piercing corporate veil);
see also Lucci, supra note 1, at 217 (noting new securities regulations could subject
previously immune people to harsh criminal sanctions).
272 15 USC § 7241 (2006) (imposing corporate responsibility for financial reports); see
Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 878 (explaining new mandated disclosures and
endorsements required by senior executives to place greater liability upon them).
273 See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers,
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1029, 1060 (2004) (stating although Sarbanes-Oxley represents no major departure from
previous law, it makes it easier to establish requisite state of mind for a criminal
conviction); see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 80, at 877 (recognizing greater legal
burdens placed directly on officers because of Sarbanes-Oxley).
274 See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (requiring CEO and CFO of publicly traded corporations
to personally endorse independent auditing reports); see also Thompson & Sale, supra
note 80, at 878 (showing how Sarbanes-Oxley requires officers to make greater efforts to
prevent fraud).
275 See Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primerfor Public Companies, and

ST.JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:3

used, especially disgorgement, the corporation and all of its
2 76
dependants suffer rather than those that created the debacle.
In response, newer, more stringent criminal statutes have proven
to be effective in deterring corporate officers from engaging in
illegal behavior. 2 77 Ensuring that liability is placed directly on
the top officers forces them to take care in keeping their
2 78
organization out of scandalous activities.
Further expanding liability on individuals is the increasing use
of "tortuous conduct" as a method of recovery from corporate
officers. 2 79 This civil cause of action not only targets corporate
executives, but has been used on employees lower down the
corporate structure that either propagated or abetted any illegal
activity. 2 80 By shifting the responsibility onto the individuals,
officers and employees strive to ensure that they are not
responsible for any wrongdoing. 2 8 1 To further ensure that
individuals are not shielded from liability, legislation exists that
Their Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 NOVA L. REV. 605, 612-13 (2004)
(acknowledging officers are only criminally liable when they have knowledge of corporate
fraud, and that Sarbanes-Oxley provides incentive for officers to avail themselves of
information that could cause criminal liability if they do nothing to stop or mitigate it); see
also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary
Liability Through Legal Liability, 42 HoUs. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005) (recognizing deference
given to corporate directors essentially sparing them from liability despite their fiduciary
duties to shareholders prior to Sarbanes-Oxley when there was less specified legal
accountability).
276 See Ausness, supra note 77, at 908-09 (raising concern about wide-scale
disgorgement and damage awards against corporations and their externalities); see also
U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing argument
regarding excessive civil punishment and its potential adverse economic effects).
277 See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(2006) (imposing new requirements on corporate officers); see
also Lucci, supra note 1, at 215-16 (fleshing out Sarbanes-Oxley and its provisions).
278 See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(2006) (creating more accountability upon corporate officers);
see also Fairfax, supra note 275, at 395 (arguing that increased accountability and
liability upon officers is key to establishing avoidance of fraudulent activity).
279 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 24-25 (suggesting alternative methods
used to hold corporate officials and their subordinates responsible for their actions); see
also AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F. Supp. 747, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(utilizing general legal concepts of agency law to hold non-fiduciary level employees liable
for fraudulent activities).
280 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 24-25 (considering deeper prosecution
into corporate scandals to root out everyone that had roles in illegal acts); see also
Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 917 P.2d 222, 227 (Ariz. 1996) (upholding damage award
against corporate defendant for breach of fiduciary duty based upon "aiding and abetting"
by lower level employees).
281 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 24-25 (underscoring individual liability
through "aiding and abetting" theories); see also Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579
F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978) (outlining legal standard for "aiding and abetting"
fiduciaries in corporate settings).
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disallows the discharge of liability for tortuous action when that
individual goes into debt.282 Specifically, bankruptcy laws have
caught on and barred this type of debt from release. 2 83
Essentially, placing the burden onto those responsible for
violating laws abrogates the protective shield that forces
prosecutors to use RICO.284 By doing so, justice is served without
resorting to last ditch effort measures such as RICO
28
disgorgement that do little to quell the problem. 5
CONCLUSION

Though founded as an innovative and flexible means to fight
organized crime, RICO has prudential limitations. Taking
advantage of RICO's broad language, though seemingly
advantageous, has counter-intuitive effects. The drafters never
intended for prosecutors to infer new punitive methods onto
civilly deemed racketeering enterprises. If such methods are
utilized, legitimate industry will be dramatically harmed. Thus,
civil disgorgement frustrates the original intentions of RICO:
keeping racketeering harm from infiltrating legitimate
organizations.
Using non-discriminatory, instead of careful,
surgical punishment,
prosecution efforts unintentionally
hampers useful entities. Therefore, carefully precise, proactive
measures are more fitting for rooting out corporate misconduct.
Those measures are able to infiltrate the misbehaving few while
sparing law-abiding organizations.

282 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20-21 (arguing for strict bankruptcy
laws to keep those complicit in fraud from benefiting from their actions); see also, 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (precluding discharge from debt if accrued on fraudulent bases).
283 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20-21 n.10 (reviewing changes to debt
relief laws against illegal actors); see also 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) (2006) (creating new
standards and threshold questions impeding discharge of debt for fraudulent activity).
284 See Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20 n.10 (urging more personal
responsibility be placed upon corporate actors including those complicit with fiduciary
actors); see also Monsen, 579 F.2d. at 799-800 (setting up basis for personal liability
against all those involved with fraudulent activity).
285 See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersectionof State CorporationLaw
and Employee Compensation Programs:Is it Curtainsfor Veil Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1059, 1077-82 (1996) (discussing when state law generally allows those harmed to
"pierce the veil" and hold individual actors accountable despite general corporate shields
to liability); see also Clemency & Smith, supra note 175, at 20-21 (exploring mechanisms
to hold actors, both fiduciary and non-fiduciary, personally liable for misconduct).

